

## An Open Letter to Prime Minister Mark Carney, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2025

Mr. Carney,

As you stand for your first election to the House of Commons as a Member of Parliament, you are also seeking a mandate from Canadians to become their Prime Minister and to lead this nation.

You are presenting your financial background as the requisite and relevant experience to lead a nation without having demonstrated to Canadians your ability to tackle difficult political issues in any real capacity other than in proposed and unfulfilled election promises. Perhaps it was your lack of political and government experience that saw you mishandle the extremely serious matter with your current Member of Parliament Paul Chiang. Liberal MP Chiang not only acted without integrity as a Member of Parliament and former Police Officer, but openly called for the abduction and hand over of a Canadian citizen and political opponent to a foreign country that the Liberal government has criticized for human rights violations.

This unparalleled action in Canadian history was your first public test as a leader to demonstrate your respect for the rule of law and to act swiftly with integrity. You hesitated and did not publicly demonstrate the recognition of the seriousness of the offence. The Liberal party has long espoused that they, and Canada respect the rule of law. The time for you to prove this with meaningful action is now.

We the undersigned citizens are presenting you with an opportunity to demonstrate to all Canadians that you are worthy of their support, that you are a leader of integrity, that you respect the rule of law, and that you will always act in the best interest of Canadians ahead of partisan politics.

The Liberal Cabinet Ministers named herein past and present, some now working in your Prime Ministers Office have directly and by intent permitted serious breaches of Canadian Law. They have failed to act on serious allegations related to National Security, conducted themselves in their Cabinet roles with apparent malfeasance, and as a result have ultimately placed several Canadian citizens at grave risk.

After two years of inaction by these Cabinet Ministers that you have now assumed leadership of, several innocent Canadians have been placed at risk of direct retaliation by Chinese foreign intelligence and security agencies. Had any of your Ministers acted in the two years prior to October of 2024 when their intervention was requested by the undersigned, they would have stopped innocent Canadians from being identified for their activities and knowledge of Canadian covert intelligence operations in China. These innocent individuals now and forever have a target on their backs unnecessarily in a war of espionage between Canada and China.

We are asking you to show leadership and immediately remove the below listed individuals from your party and/or this election. We of course are offering you documents, communication records, and evidence to support these claims. The named Ministers past and present of concern are as follows:

- 1) **Marco Mendicino** – failed as Minister of Public Safety to act in protecting Canadians abroad from potential arrest and detention, failed to respond on direction from Prime Minister Trudeau's office to address impropriety at CSIS and the RCMP, permitted breaches of law, breaches of process, and breaches of policy by both CSIS and the RCMP.
- 2) **Dominic LeBlanc** – failed as Minister of Public Safety to address breaches against Canadians with improper use of electronic spyware by CSIS and the RCMP, failed to address breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights, permitted breaches against Labour Unions by improper government use of spyware, failed to hold to account CSIS and RCMP to their restrictions of operations in Sensitive Sectors of

National Security, and failed to respond to these concerns after direction from the Prime Minister of Canada. Further did not hold CSIS to account for withholding critical National Security information from an active RCMP National Security investigation.

- 3) **Bill Blair** – failed as Minister of Public Safety by authorizing extreme powers for CSIS to undertake inappropriate actions against innocent Canadians, permitted breaches of the Ministerial Directive on National Security operations in Sensitive Sectors, permitted breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights.
- 4) **David McGuinty** – failed as Chair of NSICOP and recently Minister of Public Safety to address improper actions of CSIS for withholding critical National Security information from an RCMP investigation, failed to protect the Canadian Charter of Rights, failed to address risks to Canadian citizens abroad.
- 5) **Anita Anand** – failed as the President of the Treasury Board to intercede and address improper use of spyware by the RCMP against a Labour Union Executive during a period of collective bargaining and unfair labour practice filing. Did further fail to uphold the Canadian Charter of Rights and permitted the Treasury Board of Canada to engage in bad faith collective bargaining knowing that serious breaches of law had occurred.
- 6) **Steve Mackinnon** – failed as Minister of Labour to uphold the Canadian Charter of Rights, failed to investigate breaches by the RCMP in labour designated Sensitive Sectors during sanctioned labour activities and collective bargaining.
- 7) **Melanie Joly** – failed as Minister of Foreign Affairs to address safety risks to Canadians travelling abroad to China and their family Member's in China resulting from the public release of protected Section 38 National Security documents by the RCMP and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada without redaction.
- 8) **Arif Viranni** - failed as Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada to address safety risks to Canadians travelling abroad to China and their family Member's in China resulting from the public release of protected Section 38 National Security documents by the RCMP and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada without redaction.
- 9) **Chrystia Freeland** – failed as Deputy Prime Minister to address reported breaches of labour rights, misuse of spyware technology by CSIS and RCMP, breaches of Charter Rights.

Mr. Carney, you have an opportunity to prove unequivocally to all Canadians that you will place Canada, Canadians, Ministerial responsibilities, and the rule of law above partisan political activity. If indeed you are presenting Canadians a choice of "something new", then take action now rather than making election campaign promises to "look into it" later. Demonstrate that you are not the same old government of the past nine years that has failed to protect Canada. It is never wrong to do the right thing and to earn the trust and confidence of Canadians.

If you wish to be a nation builder for the future then you must not surround yourself and empower the failed engineers of the past.

Submitted Respectfully,

Sgt. Peter Merrifield & Det. Paul McNamara (Ret.)

## **Supporting Material**

The information contained within was released publicly and without redaction or vetting by Quebec RCMP National Security Unit and Public Prosecutors in October of 2024. This questionable Chinese interference file was manufactured by CSIS who mishandled critical national security intelligence during the Meng Wanzhou – Two Michaels crisis. CSIS betrayed one of its own Canadian covert foreign contract intelligence agents operating in China, and tried to terminate a serving Mountie based on false engineered allegations to cover up their own lack of real time intelligence on the international crisis between China and Canada. CSIS then provided this false intelligence to the US Department of State leading to the termination of a security cleared Canadian former police officer employed as Director of Security for the US State Department facilities in Canada. Furthermore, CSIS provided this erroneous intelligence to the Prime Ministers Office, the Minister of Public Safety and the Privy Council Office of Canada. When the scenario was forwarded to the RCMP to begin a Foreign Interference National Security investigation CSIS withheld critical national security information from the RCMP and sent them on a wild goose chase to cover up their own intelligence failures.

Believing they had been given a critical espionage file from CSIS the RCMP mishandled the investigation in a catastrophic format and attempted to link innocent individuals through their participation in federal elections and political nominations with the Conservative Party of Canada to Chinese foreign influence. This was completely unrelated to the matter under investigation yet the RCMP felt compelled to create unrelated connections to the Conservative Party of Canada. RCMP Integrated National Security Enforcement Team submitted this information to the Courts in pursuit of authorization for further warrants in their investigation.

### **Excerpts from Quebec RCMP INSET Information to obtain Warrants**

***50. In 2004, MAJCHER ran, unsuccessfully, for the federal Conservative nomination in Richmond, British Columbia. He was soon after suspended with pay pending the outcome of an internal investigation. Although the reasons for his suspension are not clear and may be related to a number of factors, the timing suggests that his involvement in politics may have played a role. MAJCHER's lawyer later sent a letter to British Columbia E Division then commanding officer Bev Busson charging that the force's conduct toward MAJCHER "has been egregious, reckless and, in some cases, defamatory of him and has caused him, undue emotional, professional and financial harm". The letter ended by stating that, if the RCMP was not willing to "amicably resolve this matter", then more formal steps would be taken in preparation for "future potential litigation". MAJCHER retired in 2007 after being offered a settlement in return for a non-disclosure agreement.***

***{Affiant's comment: As explained later in this document, Merrifield, another RCMP member, also ran for the Conservative party during the same election in Ontario.}***

### **Peter Merrifield's links to MAJCHER**

***62. Peter Merrifield is a regular member of the RCMP and currently the vice-president of the RCMP's union, the National Police Federation out of Newmarket, Ontario. From May 2016 to January 2020, Merrifield was assigned to the RCMP protective services for domestic and foreign dignitaries in Toronto.***

***{Affiant's comment: Considering that Merrifield is part of the executive branch of the NPF, he would have ongoing access to and contacts with current RCMP membership. The NPF has a representative role of the membership before the RCMP's executive. However, the extent of Merrifield's access to police databases is unknown to me at this time.}***

***Sources: - Board of directors- NPF***

***- Linked in social network page of Pete Merrifield, dated January 24, 2022***

**63. In early 2004, MERRFIELD sought and obtained a nomination of the Conservative Party of Canada to stand for election in the June 2004 federal general election. Merrifield was not elected. In April 2005, Merrifield decided to seek the Conservative Party nomination in a riding in Barrie, Ontario. Merrifield pleaded that thereafter he became the target of harassment and abuse of authority by his superiors in the RCMP, all of which was directed at silencing him and restraining his political participation. Merrifield subsequently sued the RCMP. Merrifield was then represented by, amongst others, Toronto-based lawyers John K. Phillips and Laura C. Young. The Court proceedings lasted until September 2019 when the Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") dismissed the application made by Merrifield for leave to appeal from the judgement of the Court of Appeal of Ontario.**

**[Affiant's comment: During his May 17, 2019 secondary examination by CBSA officers at the Toronto airport, MAJCHER told the officer that he would be meeting with lawyers Young and Philips regarding his business in Banking-Security. It would appear that this was the same law firm representing Merrifield in his lawsuit against the RCMP at the time. MAJCHER also stated that he would be meeting with an old friend with the RCMP. On May 14, 2019, 3 days prior to MAJCHER's visit to Toronto, Merrifield filed an application for leave to appeal with the SCC. Although MAJCHER did not name him, I suspect that this friend may have been Merrifield. As stated before, Merrifield worked in Toronto at the time and therefore likely lived in the Toronto area as well. As explained later, Merrifield is also a contact of MAJCHER's on the Linked/n social media network.]**

**Document sought by way of a production order for transmission data, pursuant to section 487.016 of the Criminal code**

**Peter Merrifield's phone records**

**84. Considering the following events, as laid out above in this information to obtain, I believe that MAJCHER and Merrifield are acquainted and have communicated with one another:**

- a. The similarities between MAJCHER's and Merrifield's political involvement with the conservative party in 2005;**
- b. Their respective apparent professional disciplinary backlash that ensued;**
- c. The timing of MAJCHER's visit to Toronto in May 2019;**
- d. His statement to CBSA regarding a meeting at Philips and Young law firm in Toronto;**
- e. Philips and Young being the same law firm representing Merrifield in his lawsuit against the RCMP at the time;**
- f. Merrifield filing of an application for leave with the SCC three (3) days prior, an important step in his lawsuit;**
- g. MAJCHER's statement to CBSA of a dinner with "an old RCMP friend";**
- h. Merrifield worked in Toronto at the time and is an RCMP member;**
- i. Merrifield and MAJCHER being each others' contact on the Linked In social media.**

In direct violation of Section 38 National Security Act Restrictions on the Disclosure of material harmful to the Security of Canada the Quebec RCMP INSET and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) wilfully released without cause unvetted and unredacted material likely to cause harm in contravention of Section 38. This public release of national security information vexatiously identifies Canadian citizens acting at the direction of Canada engaged in covert intelligence operations in China, or having possession of documents identifying those operations. The named individuals are now at risk of cyber attack, and physical personal safety retaliation by foreign intelligence and security agencies. Several compromised Canadians sought the assistance of Liberal Cabinet Ministers prior to the unprecedented disclosure of protected national security material by the PPSC and RCMP but were ignored and refused assistance.

**The Following National Security Information was divulged publicly by PPSC and RCMP in 2024**



## CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX

Affidavit in support of an information to obtain  
General production orders pursuant to Section 487.014 of the *Criminal code*

---

### DO NOT DISCLOSE

This section contains sensitive information that may be subject to subsequent applications for exclusion from disclosure pursuant to Section 38 of the *Canada Evidence Act*. In order to fulfil my obligation for full, fair and frank disclosure, I have included in this section details that were not included in the main body of this information to obtain, but that I believe are relevant for review by the issuing Justice. Prior to disclosure of this information to obtain, I would respectfully request that this confidential appendix be removed so that sensitive and/or potentially injurious information that could jeopardise Canada's international relations and/or related to Canada's national security is not made public or disclosed to unauthorized persons or entities.

#### Information provided to Merrifield by MAJCHER

1. Subsequent to interviews conducted by the investigative team with Merrifield in November 2022, Merrifield provided the investigators with a document which contains supplemental information and clarifications on his statement. Amongst the information contained on the document is a section titled "Other information obtained from Majcher in 2022" which contains notes provided by MAJCHER to Merrifield, and relates to interactions MAJCHER would have had with CSIS employees over the years. Here is a summary of MAJCHER's notes provided to us by Merrifield:
  - a. Around 2011-2012, MAJCHER was contacted in Hong Kong by a former RCMP member he knew who was now working for CSIS. This CSIS member asked MAJCHER to assist in arranging the establishment of weapons caches and assist in the movement of sidearms across borders for CSIS assets;
  - b. A few months later, this same CSIS member reached out to MAJCHER to inquire about some Chinese companies and people, including ZTE and Huawei. They discussed business practices and ways of covertly inserting CSIS personnel in the local business community. The CSIS member was aware of MAJCHER's prior experience in the development of the RCMP's backstopping program for covert operations;
  - c. At one point, the CSIS member asked MAJCHER if he would consider "employing" one or two CSIS members through his company as part of their cover story;

- d. Around 2012-2013, the CSIS member contacted MAJCHER and tried to recruit him to conduct a covert intelligence gathering operation on CSIS's behalf. A few months later, MAJCHER had further meetings with CSIS in Canada in that regard;
- e. In a subsequent meeting in Hong Kong, MAJCHER met with a British intelligence MI-6 representative. MI-6 would be co-running this joint operation with CSIS;
- f. During subsequent meetings outside China, MAJCHER was provided by CSIS with material and secure communication devices and informed on protocols;
- g. This whole intelligence gathering operation ran approximately for less than 24 months and ended in 2014 or early 2015;
- h. MAJCHER would be paid in USD cash delivered in an envelope provided by a CSIS member;
- i. The CSIS member handling MAJCHER indicated to him that MI-6 involvement was CSIS' way to circumvent Canadian laws which did not allow CSIS to operate extraterritorially at that time. MAJCHER stated to be troubled by this, and to fear having become unwittingly ensnared in an operation not sanctioned by Canadian law;
- j. In the final meeting and debriefing, MAJCHER was provided by CSIS with a safe email drop in case he was later approached by China's Ministry of State Security ("MSS"). On July 7, 2018, MAJCHER used the email drop as he thought MSS had contacted him but never received any answer back;

*[Affiant's comment: MSS is the PRC's intelligence and counterespionage agency]*

- k. On January 6-7, 2019, MAJCHER attended a Canadian embassy to meet with his former CSIS handler. He left a message with the RCMP officer on site and was later contacted and met by a different CSIS member;
- l. MAJCHER indicated to this new CSIS member that he had been asked by Anbound to attend Canada to see what he could find out about the circumstances surrounding the Meng Wanzhou case. MAJCHER didn't know who Anbound's client was but suspected it to be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

*[Affiant's comment: Open source Internet research conducted by the investigative team showed that AnBound appears to be a Beijing-based think tank specialising in public policy research on geopolitics, international relations, urban and social development and economy. The relation between AnBound and the CCP is unclear.]*

Source: - LinkedIn page for AnBound

- m. MAJCHER expressed to this new CSIS member his openness to work for CSIS again, but the offer was denied. The CSIS member did however indicate they would be interested in knowing what questions AnBound was asking him as that would be very valuable intelligence. MAJCHER advised that it would mean staying engaged with the Chinese and providing enough info that would keep them

engaged, while not providing anything sensitive or with a security classification. MAJCHER said it was easy for him not to provide anything government sensitive as he had left government for a long time and knew where the lines were and would never compromise anyone. MAJCHER added that he couldn't really have access to any sensitive information anymore since almost all of his friends in policing were now retired. MAJCHER told the CSIS agent that he would be flying to Canada in January and would have his notebook and phone with him which contain notes and documents that would be of interest to CSIS;

**[Affiant's comment:** The veracity of MAJCHER's account of any former relationship with CSIS is currently unknown.]


- n. On January 11, 2019, MAJCHER attended Chenzhen and met with AnBound who provided him with USD 10,000 for his involvement in the Meng Wanzhou case. AnBound simply wanted to understand what was happening, who was involved, what will happen next and if Meng will be sent immediately to the United States;
- o. On January 16, 2019, MAJCHER returned to Canada via Vancouver. He indicated to CBSA he was in Vancouver on behalf of a client to learn more about the Huawei case. He was subsequently sent to secondary examination where his belongings were examined, including his electronics;

**[Affiant's comment:** MAJCHER's travel history obtained from CBSA confirms that he travelled to Canada that day and a CBSA examination report shows he was questioned by officers.]

- p. MAJCHER stayed in Vancouver for a week then departed back to Hong Kong on January 24, 2020. MAJCHER indicates most of his time was spent catching up with friends and family. MAJCHER stated not going to or making any enquiries at any government office, nor having any contact or communication with anyone from China or working with China or Huawei;
- q. MAJCHER stated that most of what he reported back to AnBound was in fact learned before he left Hong Kong from local and HSBC related sources;
- r. While in Vancouver, MAJCHER reached out to Paul MacNamara, an old friend from his time in the police. Paul worked for the US consulates in Canada but he never once asked a single question regarding his employment with the US Consulates or the Huawei situation;
- s. From May 17 to 22, 2019, MAJCHER flew to Toronto with Conrad Wan ("Wan"), a lawyer with Capital Chamber. At this time, MAJCHER's engagement with AnBound on the Huawei matter was terminated, but along with Wan continued monitoring Meng's legal proceedings. Together, they worked at understanding the possible legal strategies that could be brought forward in the event the Canadian Court was to order Meng's extradition. This work was made pre-

emptively, in order to be able to offer a “plan B” legal strategy to Meng’s father and Huawei;

**[Affiant’s comment:** Again, MAJCHER’s travel history obtained from CBSA confirms that he returned to Canada on May 17, 2019.]

- t. MAJCHER and Wan met with a representative of the McMillan law firm in Toronto to discuss a possible collaboration in mediating the China-Canada relationship, including the “two Michael” situation. MAJCHER indicated that nothing came of these efforts to engage with Global Affairs Canada.
- 



**RE: Office of the Prime Minister/Cabinet du premier ministre**

Prime Minister | Premier Ministre &lt;PM@pm.gc.ca&gt;

To: petemerrifield@ [REDACTED]

12/02/2024 01:09 PM

2



Dear Mr. Merrifield:

I would like to acknowledge receipt of your email of September 26, 2024, sent to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. I regret the lengthy delay in replying.

Please be assured that your comments have been carefully reviewed. I note that you have also addressed your email to the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs. While the Prime Minister appreciates the time you have taken to write, he will leave the matter you raise to be considered by the Minister.

Thank you for writing.

A. Oldford  
Executive Correspondence Officer / Agente de la correspondance  
Executive Correspondence Services / Services de la correspondance de la haute direction

----- Original Message -----

From: petemerrifield@ [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2024, 8:58 AM

To: dominic.leblanc@parl.gc.ca; steven.mackinnon@parl.gc.ca; anita.anand@parl.gc.ca; chrystia.freeland@parl.gc.ca; justin.trudeau@parl.gc.ca;

Cc: pmac545@ [REDACTED]

Subject: Fwd: High Priority: Abuse of ODIT Spyware against trade unions by RCMP and CSIS

Mr. Prime Minister and Ministers,

I am following up as we now approach three weeks since first reaching out to you. In fact Detective McNamara and myself reached to you Mr. Prime Minister in 2023 before the improper use of ODIT spyware by the RCMP against Union devices and documents during a period of collective bargaining and an Unfair Labour Practice hearing against the RCMP. At that time Mr. Prime Minister your office advised me that I would hear from Minister Mendicino, disappointingly neither then Minister Mendicino nor his office ever reached out on these very serious matters.

Minister Freeland as you prepare to attend the Collective Bargaining Conference in Toronto on September 27th I would like to remind you and the other recipients of this email of difficult and acrimonious fight that I faced the past 21 years to win the right for Members of the RCMP to have the same rights of collective bargaining and association that the rest of the Federal Public Service and all other Canadian Police Services enjoy. As President of the Mounted Police Association of Ontario (MPAO) we filed in the courts in 2005 and faced resistance from successive Federal Governments and multiple Commissioners of the RCMP. This challenge was not without significant personal sacrifice, workplace retaliation, and bullying from the most senior levels of the RCMP. Having the Supreme Court of Canada grant these rights in the MPAO Decision of 2015 I went on the Co-Founder the National Police Federation (NPF) to unite all provinces, RCMP Divisions and labour groups in the RCMP to form a single united representation model.

The fundamental Canadian principles of respecting the rule of law, the right to a safe workplaces, rights of association, and the rights of collective bargaining have often been espoused by your government. I am asking you to now please acknowledge the allegations of serious breaches of these rights and to engage with me to correct the abuses. Acknowledgement and meaningful intervention by your Government can only inspire confidence by all workers in all sectors that their rights and efforts are respected by this Government.

The allegations that Detective McNamara and I present are founded in fact with significant official document evidence and I assure you that these are not the speculations of disenfranchised individuals. These are deep rooted fact based concerns by loyal and patriotic professionals that are depending on this Government to defend these core Canadian principles and rights, and to stand up for what is right.

As a matter of courtesy I would expect to receive some acknowledgment after three weeks from you as these allegations represent a serious undermining of legally protected Canadian rights and privileges.

I await your acknowledgement and action in these matters.

Submitted Respectfully,

Sgt. Peter Merrifield M.O.M  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Co-Founder National Police Federation  
[REDACTED]

----- Original Message -----

From: petemerrifield@ [REDACTED]

To: anita.anand@parl.gc.ca; steven.mackinnon@parl.gc.ca; dominic.leblanc@parl.gc.ca

Sent: Friday, September 20th 2024, 11:44 AM

Subject: High Priority: Abuse of ODIT Spyware against trade unions by RCMP and CSIS

Ministers Anand, Mackinnon, and LeBlanc, ETHI Chair Brassard,

I made the below submission some two weeks ago and have been awaiting acknowledgment that you have reviewed the material and appreciate the seriousness of the submitted allegations. As President of the Treasury Board, Minister of Labour, and Minister of Public Safety I would hope that you appreciate the unprecedented breaches of Canada's democratic society, freedom of labour association, and the risk to the reputation of both the Government of Canada and RCMP.

To be clear my name is Peter Merrifield, a Sgt currently with the RCMP, the Co-Founder of the National Police Federation, past Vice President of the National Police Federation, a key Member in the 20+ year effort to win the right for Labour Association for the Members of the RCMP.

The below allegations can be fully supported with document evidence that speaks to the breaches and violations committed by CSIS and the RCMP between January 2019 and present. Of greatest immediate concern is the use by the RCMP in June 2023 of On Device Investigative Technology (ODIT electronic spyware) on my National Police Federation cell phone, communication apps, and documents. This occurred during the designated period of collective bargaining between the National Police Federation, the Treasury Board Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The deployment of remote spyware by the RCMP was unprecedented based on the testimony of RCMP Deputy Commissioner Flynn and Larkin in the attached House of Commons Report by the ETHI Committee on the use of ODIT Spyware. As Committee Chair Brassard can confirm the use of ODIT's by both CSIS and the RCMP are reserved for the most serious cases of National Security, Terrorism, or where risk of death or serious injury is imminent. ODIT's are usually deployed

covertly as part of a serious investigation against suspects, and the use of the ODIT is considered to be the greatest privacy intrusion permitted by law.

In this situation where it was deployed against me and my Union devices I was a sitting Union Executive, a Member of the RCMP on Leave Without Pay for Union Business, I possessed a Top Secret security classification, and I was a witness (not suspect) in their conspiracy investigation which did not meet any of the criteria required for ODIT deployment as outlined in the HOC Report. Perhaps most disturbing in this matter is that the RCMP had been provided an extensive witness interview by me and they were fully apprised that communication between their conspiracy suspect and myself had occurred only on my personal cell phone and devices which long predated the existence of my Union phone number, and devices. The RCMP executed dozens of warrants, production orders, and subscriber checks and were fully aware that I possessed separate personal and Union cellular accounts. In fact the information was on the electronic signature block of my many communications with the RCMP in this matter and was clearly recognized by the RCMP as my Union number and devices. Contrary to good investigative practice the RCMP did not execute ODIT deployment upon my personal devices where they had been advised evidence may exist related to their investigation, they decided to only deploy ODIT upon my Union devices, apps, and documents. It also appears that the RCMP failed to comply with Public Safety Ministerial Directives as they relate to National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors of Canadian society which includes Labour and Trade Unions. The RCMP also permitted a serious conflict of interest to occur by investigators and breached the privilege of ongoing NSIRA investigations against the RCMP.

This action should deeply concern all of you and be cause to invite further involvement by you and your respective portfolios.

There is much more to this story involving CSIS and their breaches against the privacy of their own employees, Members of the RCMP, foreign and domestic dignitaries, the Prime Minister and some of you as Cabinet Ministers. I encourage to acknowledge your receipt of this information, the seriousness of it, and to contact me to provide details and evidence. The National Police Federation is less than 90 days away from serving notice to bargain again with the Treasury Board and it is imperative that we address these concerns before that occurs.

Submitted Respectfully,

Peter Merrifield, Sgt. RCMP  
Co-Founder and past Vice President of the National Police Federation  
petemerrifield@ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

— Original Message —

From: petemerrifield@ [REDACTED]  
To: john.brassard@parl.gc.ca; E.HI@parl.gc.ca Cc: petemerrifield@ [REDACTED] pmac545 [REDACTED] justin.trudeau@parl.gc.ca; chrystia.freeland@parl.gc.ca; dominic.leblanc@parl.gc.ca; anita.anand@parl.gc.ca; steven.mackinnon@parl.gc.ca  
Sent: Saturday, September 7th 2024, 01:38 PM  
Subject: High Priority: Abuse of ODIT Spyware against trade unions by RCMP and CSIS

Dear Chair and Clerk of the Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Committee,

I have copied the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Public Safety Minister, President of the Treasury Board, and Minister of Labour in this message as the matters below hold serious consideration and ramifications for their respective portfolios.

My name is Peter Merrifield and I am a current serving Sergeant in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Co-Founder of the National Police Federation (NPF). I write in support of retired Vancouver Police Detective Paul McNamara's earlier disclosure to you of RCMP and CSIS abuses of ODIT technology. I wish to provide evidence and to express my own fact based deep concern over the recent egregious abuses of this ODIT Spyware by both CSIS and the RCMP.

CSIS breaches: between January 2019 and September 2021 CSIS deployed ODIT spyware on my personal and Union cellphones while I was an active Member of the RCMP. I held Top Secret Security Classification and was also indoctrinated above TS at the time of the electronic intrusion by CSIS. During the period of the intrusion I held two distinct roles: 1) operations commander at RCMP Protective Policing in Toronto, 2) Co-Chair and National Vice President of the National Police Federation. (the NPF is the certified Union for the 20,000+ Members of the RCMP)

Acting on false and uncorroborated information CSIS deployed ODIT on my devices which was motivated on their part by a panicked "fishing trip" related to diplomatic tensions between Canada and China during the Meng Wanzhou and 2 Michaels affair. CSIS breached the following privacy, ethical, and legal concerns:

- i) violated operational security, RCMP communication, and the privacy of foreign dignitaries, foreign and domestic Heads of State, Members of the Royal Family, the Prime Minister of Canada, numerous Cabinet Ministers of Canada, and supporting law enforcement and intelligence agency information.
- ii) violated Labour privilege under Canada's Ministerial Directive on Sensitive Sector operations for National Security during the certification, operation, and collective bargaining of the NPF with the Government of Canada/Treasury Board of Canada in 2020/2021.
- iii) violated the confidential identities of CSIS employees who had discreetly and with hopes of anonymity from their employer (CSIS) reached out to me for assistance to organize labour association for CSIS employees to address deep concerns of toxic workplace culture, workplace harassment, sexual harassment, workplace racial and gender discrimination and general poor working conditions.
- iv) violated my solicitor client privilege with counsel regarding issues of wrongdoing and harassment in the RCMP and ongoing civil litigation matters before the courts.
- v) violated private communication between myself and the Commissioner of the RCMP on sensitive matters.
- vi) violated the privacy of countless Members of the RCMP communicating with me on discreet and privileged matters related to their RCMP Code of Conduct and Public Complaint issues.

Confirmation of the use of ODIT by CSIS is corroborated in their written production of false and edited allegations derived from private personal meetings I held with individuals in public setting. The individuals I met with were not subject of ODIT deployment at the time and the edited and selective reciting/reporting of the meeting by CSIS could only be intercepted from my personal, Union, and RCMP cellular devices which were all present and in my possession at the time of the meetings.

RCMP breaches: the RCMP from "C" Division INSET acting upon the same poisoned and false intelligence CSIS had engineered into a false notice by advisory letter to the RCMP also sought authorization to deploy ODIT spyware. RCMP "C" INSET sought the assistance of RCMP Covert Access and Intercept Team, and ultimately deployed ODIT spyware on myself, retired Detective McNamara, and two other individuals in June of 2023. Of note and concern is that both McNamara and myself were designated "witnesses" by the RCMP national security investigation team as were the two other individuals that were subject of ODIT deployment in this instance. The use of ODIT spyware on witnesses appears to be unprecedented at this time.

Please consider the following issues of concern with the deployment of ODIT spyware on Merrifield and McNamara by RCMP "C" INSET:

- i) the RCMP investigation did not warrant the use of ODIT by defined risk or severity as reported to your committee in the testimony of RCMP D/Commr's Flynn and Larkin, and former Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino. The investigation did not meet standards and criteria for ODIT deployment as none of the four individuals targeted were suspects in the case. All four targeted individuals for ODIT deployment were witnesses. Further to this the case held no risk of grievous bodily harm or death to any individual, the case was not a national security matter possessing any risk compromise to the integrity or operation of the Government of Canada, nor was it terrorism related.
- ii) RCMP mishandled the deployment of the ODITs and on four separate application attempts deployed it to incorrect cell phone numbers placing unsuspecting innocent Canadians as the victims of a complete compromise of all of their personal information, data, and communications.
- iii) RCMP knowingly deployed ODIT on my NPF Union cell phone rather than my personal cell phone that held contact information with their suspect in this case. The RCMP clearly received subscriber information by warrant from the cell service providers on how many cell phones I possessed, clearly identifying which were personal and which were Union. During my witness interview with the RCMP I advised that my personal phone was the only one used to communicate with their suspect. In stark intentional action the RCMP sought to deploy ODIT spyware on my protected Union cell phone while I was a serving Labour Union Executive and Officer of the NPF Corporation. This would require the RCMP to see Ministerial Directive compliance for National Security investigations in Sensitive Sectors. They did not seek this authorization, yet they did seek it in this investigation of other Sensitive Sector witnesses who were sitting Senators or retired Judges. Clearly the RCMP knew this Sensitive Sector authorization was required and yet they elected to breach the legal requirement to access my National Police Federation Union cell phone, email, and secure communication applications.
- iv) The deliberate and unauthorized RCMP use of ODIT spyware occurred in June 2023 while I was a Member of the NPF collective bargaining team engaged in active contract negotiations with the Treasury Board of Canada. The NPF Collective Bargaining team utilized secured communication apps on our phones actively during collective bargaining which the Treasury Board and RCMP now meaning that the RCMP had full access as a result to the privileged NPF bargaining materials because of the RCMP ODIT deployment.
- v) during this period as NPF Vice President I was engaged in negotiation and conversation with D/Commr Flynn on a separate significant labour matter. D/Commr Flynn is the RCMP Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing. I met with the D/Commr during this period that the ODIT was deployed on my NPF Union phone and held several confidential and privileged communications with my union colleagues regarding an issue known as Direct Federal Entry Program. Ultimately the NPF filed an Unfair Labour Practice in 2024 against the RCMP.

the RCMP which was heard by the Federal Labour Board of Canada that fall resulting in a favorable decision for the NPF against the RCMP. The RCMP had deployed the ODIT spyware during a period in which they had access to private, privileged, and sensitive Labour Union material which was directly relevant and covertly advantaged them. They conducted this intrusive and covert activity without seeking proper Sensitive Sector authority as required by Ministerial Directive.

vi) at no time during the RCMP investigation (2021-2024) did the RCMP ask me to provide the materials they claimed they required in judicial authorization to deploy ODIT spyware. I had submitted to an extensive witness interview and provided them more than 15 pages of highly sensitive information regarding foreign intelligence by contract agents of CSIS to assist their investigation. I also identified the RCMP suspect as a contracted Canadian citizen acting as a foreign operative for CSIS in China which was information CSIS had withheld from the RCMP complicating the ongoing RCMP investigation. At no time did the RCMP seek preservation orders, assistance orders, or production orders for their alleged evidence requirements to me which as a sworn peace officer, Member of the RCMP, and elected trade union executive I would have complied with fully and legally. There was absolutely no evidence, communication, or material to aid the RCMP investigation on my NPF Union cell phone. As the RCMP was seeking authorization to deploy ODIT spyware, it defies logic that they would not have sought authorization to also access my personal cell phone at the very same time they misrepresented the requirement to gain access to my union cell phone, data, emails, and secure communication apps.

Mr. Chair, Members of the ETHI Committee, Clerk, and et al,

Detective McNamara and myself believe these breaches and abuses to be unequalled in Canadian Law Enforcement activity, and that they were carried out in direct contravention of the guiding principals, policies, and legislation required for the careful and lawful use of the most invasive and sensitive technology employed by Canada's National Police and Intelligence Services. Detective McNamara and Sgt Merrifield have a combined 50+ years of experience in major case police investigations, national security investigations, and intelligence experience. We do not make these allegations lightly, or without the absolute professional expertise to support our position.

We implore you to protect innocent Canadians from this type of illegal and abusive use of spyware technology by the Government of Canada, and to hold these agencies to account to conduct themselves in a lawful and professional manner when using these powerful and invasive technology tools.

We would like to appear before your committee to shed light on this situation and to provide documents and materials as evidence in support of these alleged abuses.

Submitted Respectfully,  
Sgt. Peter Merrifield  
RCMP

&

Detective Paul McNamara (ret.)  
Vancouver Police Department